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Early detection of emerging disease events is a  priority focus area for cooperative
bioengagement programs. Communication and coordination among national disease 
surveillance and response networks are essential for timely detection and control of a 
public health event. Although systematic information sharing between the human and 
animal health sectors can help stakeholders detect and respond to zoonotic diseases 
rapidly, resource constraints, and other barriers often prevent efficient cross-sector
reporting. The purpose of this research project was to map the laboratory and surveil-
lance networks currently in place for detecting and reporting priority zoonotic diseases in 
Jordan in order to identify the nodes of communication, coordination, and decision-mak-
ing where health and veterinary sectors intersect, and to identify priorities and gaps
that limit information sharing for action. We selected three zoonotic diseases as case 
studies: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, rabies, and brucellosis. Through 
meetings with government agencies and health officials, and desk research, we mapped 
each system from the index case through response –  including both surveillance and 
laboratory networks, highlighting both areas of strength and those that would benefit 
from capacity-building resources. Our major findings indicate informal communication 
exists across sectors; in the event of emergence of one of the priority zoonoses studied, 
there is effective coordination across the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. 
However, routine formal coordination is lacking. Overall, there is a strong desire and 
commitment for multi-sectoral coordination in detection and response to zoonoses
across public health and veterinary sectors. Our analysis indicates that the networks 
developed in response to HPAI can and should be leveraged to develop a comprehen-
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introduction
The emergence and spread of new pathogens is one of today’s highest global health security risks 
with zoonotic diseases arguably the chief contributor. Zoonoses occur at the interface of human 
and animal health, impacting a wide range of health services and livelihoods. Social and political 
issues surround their assessment and management. Zoonotic viruses, parasites, bacteria, and fungi 
are recognized as threats to human health and sustainable development worldwide, and are a major 
concern for national and international agencies (1). Significant risk factors for the emergence and 
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rapid spread of zoonotic diseases include international travel; 
global trade; increasing interactions among humans, wildlife, 
exotic, and companion animals; human behavior; rapid microbial 
adaptation; changing climates and ecosystems; and changing live-
stock management practices (2). Domestic animals and wildlife 
are well-known reservoirs of many emerging infectious diseases; 
roughly 75% of recent emerging infections and 60% of all human 
pathogens are of zoonotic origin (3–6).
Although zoonotic diseases clearly present a significant threat 
to human and animal public health, many remain neglected due 
to competing priorities; for example, ministries of health are 
coping with growing burdens of non-communicable chronic 
diseases alongside existing maternal and child health needs, 
whereas ministries of agriculture/wildlife tend to prioritize 
livestock management for food production and trade. The costs 
of zoonoses in lives and livelihoods can be enormous. The effects 
of zoonoses on human health and economies have recently 
been underscored by notable outbreaks, such as the 2009 H1N1 
influenza virus pandemic, which began in swine farms on the 
Mexico–US border. Unfounded fears that meat products could 
transmit “swine flu” led to major losses to the North American 
pork industry, amounting to 25 million USD per week, and the 
banning of importation of pigs and pork products by at least 
15 countries (7). In addition to natural disease threats, several 
zoonoses are among agents that have the potential to cause severe 
health threats if accidentally or deliberately released.
Understanding zoonotic disease emergence, prevention, 
and control requires multi-disciplinary, collaborative basic and 
applied research. Communication and coordination among 
national disease surveillance and response networks are vital in 
ensuring the timely response to a public health event. Through 
systematic infectious zoonotic disease data collection, we can 
gain a better understanding of disease emergence and spread 
and provide mechanisms upon which to build early warning 
and response systems for animal and human health. Various 
frameworks aim to support capacity building for disease surveil-
lance and response, including the World Health Organization’s 
International Health Regulations (IHR), the World Organisation 
for Animal Health’s (OIE) Animal Terrestrial Code and Pathway 
to Veterinary Services (PVS), and the Global Health Security 
Agenda (GHSA) (8–11). Although systematic information-
sharing between the human and animal health sectors can 
help decision-makers detect and respond to zoonotic diseases 
rapidly, resource constraints, and other barriers often prevent 
efficient cross-sector reporting. Despite significant investments 
in technology, knowledge, and the availability of the frameworks 
and programs noted above, many countries still face significant 
gaps in their abilities to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to 
public health threats, including zoonotic diseases.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s abilities to prevent, detect, 
and respond to zoonoses have been tested and strengthened over 
recent years, spurred by a large brucellosis outbreak nearly a dec-
ade ago and a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 
outbreak in 2006. The Ministry of Health’s (MOH) Division of 
Zoonotic Diseases and the Ministry of Agriculture’s (MOA) 
Veterinary Services have developed a strong and cooperative 
relationship across surveillance and laboratory sectors. Although 
these relationships exist, they are informal and used only in the 
context of response to major outbreaks or events. By mapping 
zoonotic disease detection, reporting, and response capacities 
across surveillance and laboratory systems, we sought to determine 
where mechanisms exist to integrate single-disease networks into 
national zoonotic response and to identify best practices/systems 
that can be applied across all priority zoonoses. Such mapping not 
only can help identify hotspots where zoonoses pose significant 
health threats but also where efforts can be focused to improve 
prevention, communication, and coordination across veterinary 
and human health.
Materials and Methods
The methodology consisted of systematically mapping the labo-
ratory and surveillance networks currently in place for detecting 
and reporting priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan. Our analysis 
does not include geographical mapping but rather an analysis 
reviewing major elements of systematic capacity building as 
outlined by Potter and Brough (12). We identified, collated, and 
then mapped the current surveillance and laboratory systems in 
place to detect, assess, report, and respond to zoonotic diseases 
using publically available reports and key informant interviews. 
The relevant subject matter experts and other stakeholders for 
interviews and discussion were selected by the MOH Directorate 
of Communicable Diseases (DCD) and the MOA Chief 
Veterinary Officer. We selected three priority zoonotic diseases 
for our analysis with varying burdens on human and veterinary 
health sectors to better define nodes of communication and 
coordination as well as gaps for capacity building and systems 
strengthening. This type of analysis may identify current vertical, 
disease-specific strategies and frameworks that can be applied 
horizontally to develop national zoonotic disease strategies. It is 
important to note that our mapping does not address the role 
of livestock keepers and/or the density and number of livestock, 
which play a major role in disease outbreaks, transmission, and 
at times subsequent epidemics.
selection of Priority Zoonoses
There are multiple methods used in prioritizing disease detec-
tion and response capacity building, including analysis of the 
local and national burden of disease; global trends in emergence; 
economic costs associated and cross-sector impacts; human 
morbidity and mortality; and population health (3, 13–15). Our 
goal was to examine coordination and communications from 
the index case to notification at the national and international 
levels. In order to determine the mechanisms that promote 
and/or prevent information sharing across surveillance and 
laboratory networks both within and among ministries, it was 
first important to determine the priority zoonoses from both 
the public and veterinary health sectors. Both MOH and MOA 
have established priority notifiable disease lists, which are used 
to strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacities; however, 
there had not yet been a collaborative discussion on cross-
linking these lists to develop formalized multi-sectoral priorities, 
particularly with respect to zoonotic diseases. We began with 
reviewing existing MOH and MOA notifiable disease lists and 
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selecting the zoonotic diseases on each list for consideration. 
Through collaborative strategic discussions, we identified five 
MOH–MOA priority zoonoses for further ranking. We selected 
priority zoonotic diseases for case study analysis that aligned 
with three major categories of focus for intervention at the 
animal–human interface: endemic zoonoses, epidemic-prone 
zoonoses, and emerging zoonoses. Endemic zoonoses account 
for the majority of human cases and deaths, and the greatest 
reduction in livestock production. Epidemic-prone zoonoses 
occur sporadically or cyclically and the spatial distribution 
of outbreaks may vary, but epidemic-prone diseases are often 
prioritized due to their impact on health and trade. Emerging 
zoonoses (diseases that are either new to a population or are 
rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range) generally 
account for only a fraction of the zoonotic disease burden, but 
outbreaks may have unpredicted and highly disruptive effects 
(16). We assigned weight to pathogens associated with a high 
human disease burden (morbidity and mortality); impact on 
livestock and wildlife (production, economic loss); amenability 
to practice- or veterinary medicine-based interventions; exist-
ing surveillance systems; and, finally, mechanisms for improved 
stakeholder communication and coordination (17–20).
Mapping of surveillance and laboratory 
networks
In collaboration with Jordan’s Field Epidemiology Training 
Program (FETP), we developed case studies based on past 
zoonotic events to examine coordination and communications 
from the index case to notification at the national and interna-
tional levels, in order to identify priorities and gaps that limit 
information sharing for action (Figure 1). For the three selected 
priority zoonoses, we developed case studies outlined in a 
five-step process: (1) case reporting; (2) reporting and sample 
submission; (3) laboratory testing; (4) case management; and (5) 
outbreak investigation (Figure 2). For each case study, we created 
a decision tree at each of the steps noted above, identified the 
strengths and weaknesses of the system, and recommended steps 
for improvement. This resulted in a systems map that identified 
the nodes of communication, coordination, and decision-making 
where the human and veterinary health sectors intersect, high-
lighting areas of strength as well as gaps that would benefit from 
capacity-building resources. This information can be translated 
into recommendations for strengthening policies, protocols, and 
practices for preventing and responding to priority zoonoses 
across veterinary and public health sectors.
results
selecting Priority Zoonoses for analysis
In collaboration with the MOH-DCD and the MOA Veterinary 
Services, the combined Jordan FETP and The George Washington 
University Global Health Security Program (GWU) research 
team determined that the most suitable priority diseases for our 
analysis included HPAI H5N1, brucellosis, and rabies. These 
priority diseases represent endemic zoonoses (brucellosis), 
epidemic-prone zoonoses (rabies, defined as a disease in which 
exposures to a single infected animal can lead to multiple human 
cases) (16), and emerging zoonoses (HPAI H5N1).
Mapping surveillance networks
The Ministry of Health is the largest financer and provider of 
health services in Jordan. Disease surveillance efforts in Jordan 
fall under the oversight of the Director of Primary Health Care 
Administration, which oversees eight directorates within MOH 
(21). The DCD within the Primary Health Care Administration 
is charged with disease surveillance and is most active in detec-
tion, surveillance, assessment, response, and reporting activities. 
Within DCD, the Surveillance Department, Division of Applied 
Epidemiology, and Division of Infection Control (among others) 
oversee specific programs and functions. DCD’s Surveillance 
Department receives and manages information from 22 surveil-
lance sites throughout Jordan that track the 42 reportable diseases 
in country. Information flows from the health facility level to the 
health directorates, and then to DCD, where data are compiled 
and analyzed to prepare the weekly reporting bulletin. Within 
FigUre 1 | Model joint assessment and response. In collaboration with 
the Jordan Ministry of Health, Field Epidemiology Training Program, and 
Ministry of Agriculture, we examined coordination and communications from 
the index case to notification at the national and international levels in order 
to identify priorities and gaps that limit information sharing for actions. Efforts 
in surveillance and response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in 
blue while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in green.
FigUre 2 | identifying priority zoonoses and identification and networks for case management. In order to select three priority zoonotic diseases for 
analysis, we considered MOH and MOA notifiable disease lists as well as global priority zoonoses. For the three selected priority zoonoses, we developed case 
studies outlined in a five-step process: (1) case reporting; (2) reporting and sample submission; (3) laboratory testing; (4) case management; and (5) outbreak 
investigation. The resulting analysis is a systems map that identified the nodes of communication, coordination, and decision-making where the health and veterinary 
sectors intersect, highlighting both areas of strength and gaps that would benefit from capacity-building resources.
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MOA, the Secretary General Assistant for Livestock and the 
Chief Veterinary Officer have responsibility for the organization 
and implementation of veterinary services, whereas the majority 
of administrative control falls to 13 agricultural departments. 
Veterinarians are trained in the field on zoonoses communica-
tion and reporting, sample collection, and packaging. Within 
the Veterinary Services Department, there is an Animal Health 
Section, Poultry Health Section, and Veterinary Quarantine 
Section, which coordinate with the governorate level depart-
ments on disease surveillance and response. Both MOH and 
MOA have notifiable disease lists for immediate, weekly, and 
monthly reporting.
Mapping laboratory networks
Diagnostic and confirmatory laboratory services are provided 
from the Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL) to the health 
center level. CPHL oversees laboratory biosafety and biosecurity 
programs for MOH laboratories and hospitals. Each health 
directorate has a laboratory coordinator at the governorate level. 
Although Laboratory Quality Management Systems (LQMS) and 
the logistical support to manage supplies and safe specimen trans-
port exist they are uneven at the subnational level. Diagnostic and 
confirmatory testing capabilities are shared across public and pri-
vate sector laboratories, which can provide challenges in the event 
of major outbreaks. CPHL coordinates with the U.S. Naval Medical 
Research Unit 3 (NAMRU-3) located in Cairo for confirmatory 
testing when necessary. MOA has veterinary laboratories in each 
of the 12 governorates that perform routine diagnostics at varying 
levels of capacity. A lack of resources, both human and financial, 
leads to a majority of diagnostic and confirmatory testing falling to 
the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) (22). MOA coordinates 
with the UN Food and Animal Organization (FAO) and OIE to 
assist with confirmatory testing, as well as gold standard diagnos-
tic tests when these are not locally available.
October 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 2195
Sorrell et al. Mapping priority zoonoses in Jordan
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org
case study #1: highly Pathogenic avian 
influenza h5n1
As of 2006, Jordan and most of its neighbors have remained free 
of human HPAI H5N1 cases, with the exception of Egypt (which 
reported 48 deaths and 165 cases between November 2014 and 
April 2015) (23–25). Jordan’s geography puts it at low risk for the 
introduction of HPAI from migratory waterfowl due to its lack 
of surface water; key migratory bird habitats in the Jordan Valley 
and around the Gulf of Aqaba are distant from major poultry 
production facilities. A majority of Jordan’s poultry farms are 
commercial with backyard flocks comprising only 2% of the 
sector (22). The commercial sector is advanced for the region, 
including biosecurity into its best practices (26).
Existing Networks
Following devastating outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in 2006, Jordan 
established the National Committees on Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza, including the National Steering Committee, the 
National Technical Committee, and the National Center for 
Security and Crisis Management (previously the Disaster 
Management Committee) each playing a role in detection, 
reporting, and response to highly pathogenic and pandemic 
influenza. Jordan has both an Animal Health National 
Preparedness Plan and National Contingency Plan for Avian 
Influenza, which are utilized by various ministries, including 
Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Planning, Foreign Affairs, 
Transport and Communication, Interior, Industry and Trade, 
Education, Communications and IT among others. At the 
regional level, the Middle East Consortium on Infectious 
Disease Surveillance (MECIDS) network developed an Avian 
and Pandemic Influenza Sub-Regional Common Plan of Action 
for Palestine, Jordan, and Israel1. The plan defines the protection 
zone (3 km radius from affected farm designated for culling), 
surveillance zone (10  km radius from affected farm where 
enhanced surveillance and control measures must be taken), 
and case definitions for avian and human influenza cases (sus-
pected, probable, and confirmed). It also outlines principles, 
procedures, and protocols for MOA and MOH officials in the 
case of H5N1 in poultry (notification of suspected case, protec-
tion and surveillance zone established, lab confirmation of H5, 
follow-up) and in the event of H5N1 in humans (notification of 
suspected case, epidemiological investigation, lab diagnosis of 
H5 and follow-up). In 2008, 32 representatives from multiple 
sectors (health, transportation, education, interior, labora-
tory, and media) in Jordan, Palestine, and Israel participated 
in a regional pandemic influenza tabletop exercise to develop 
action items based on various influenza case scenarios, includ-
ing human-to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1. This body 
is active in disease surveillance and response across a number 
of priority diseases for the region and is able to activate and 
respond in the event of HPAI if necessary. The 2006 HPAI 
H5N1 outbreak in poultry is a good example of how and when 
MOH and MOA communicate, particularly when there was an 
immediate need and financial resources.
1 http://www.mecidsnetwork.org/
Detection, Notification, and Response
If a patient presents at a health facility or hospital and the 
clinician suspects HPAI based on clinical symptoms or due to 
reports of contact with sick poultry, the patient is isolated and 
samples are sent to the CPHL for diagnostic confirmation. The 
isolated patient is treated with antivirals and health care staff 
involved in patient care receives preventative treatment. HPAI 
is an immediate reportable Group A disease; the primary health 
care unit or hospital reports directly to the Health Directorate, 
which then reports to the DCD. MOH also communicates with 
MOA that there is a suspect human case of HPAI. Likewise, if 
there are reports of poultry deaths and/or an animal presents and 
is characterized as suspect HPAI, veterinary services will notify 
MOA, MOH, and collect samples for confirmation testing at the 
CVL. A positive rapid diagnostic test for type A influenza may 
result in quarantine or culling of affected farms while confirma-
tion testing is performed at CVL. MOA reports positive cases 
to OIE on a monthly basis, whereas MOH would immediately 
report a positive human case as outlined under IHR (2005). If 
the CVL confirms HPAI, Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) assist in 
providing personal protective equipment (PPE) and restricting 
contact to affected farms/flocks to determine proper culling pro-
cedures. In addition, a poultry vaccination team will be deployed 
to farms/flocks within a 7-km radius. In the event of a confirmed 
human case public health RRTs will conduct in-depth reports and 
follow-up with possible suspect cases and contacts. If the patient’s 
symptoms persist with unconfirmed diagnosis, treatment with 
Tamiflu continues for 7 days and care is provided per physician 
recommendations. During an outbreak MOH and MOA will 
communicate laboratory confirmed cases to each other on a daily 
basis. Jordan has both an Animal Health National Preparedness 
Plan and National Contingency Plan for Avian Influenza, 
which are utilized by various ministries including MOA and 
MOH. Figure  3 depicts a flow chart schematic of surveillance 
and laboratory channels. Mechanisms for communication and 
coordination among laboratory, public health, and veterinary 
officials at the governorate and national level are strong in the 
event of a suspect case of HPAI H5N1. Frameworks and plans 
exist and function well; however, they are only activated in the 
case of emergencies.
case study #2: rabies
Rabies is a zoonotic viral disease that causes acute inflammation 
of the brain in animals. The disease is spread to humans from 
another animal (e.g., dogs, camels, donkeys), commonly by 
a bite or scratch, although exposure of mucous membranes to 
infected saliva is also a risk. Globally, most cases are the result 
of a dog bite: exposure to rabid dogs is the cause of over 90% 
of human exposures to rabies and of over 99% of human deaths 
worldwide. Rabies is a completely preventable disease in the 
human population with effective veterinary vaccine campaigns 
and effective reporting and rapid post-exposure treatment fol-
lowing animal bites. More than 50,000 people die annually from 
rabies worldwide, despite the fact that the tools to prevent and 
manage the disease are readily available (27). Once clinical signs 
of rabies appear, the disease is nearly always fatal, and treatment 
is typically supportive.
FigUre 3 | surveillance and laboratory mapping of highly pathogenic avian influenza (hPai) h5n1. Surveillance and laboratory networks for HPAI H5N1, 
including nodes of communication and response, were mapped across human health and veterinary sectors. Systems were analyzed beginning from report of a 
suspect case to diagnostic confirmation, including evaluation: case reporting; reporting and sample submission; laboratory testing; case management; and outbreak 
investigation. Efforts in surveillance and response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in green. Positive 
cases are noted in orange while unknown/unconfirmed cases are represented in purple. Abbreviations: MOH, Ministry of Health; CPHL, Central Public Health 
Laboratory; DCD, Directorate of Communicable Diseases; MOA, Ministry of Agriculture; CVL, Central Veterinary Laboratory.
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Existing Networks
Human rabies cases are rather rare in Jordan. Dog bites account 
for the vast majority of suspect human rabies cases in Jordan 
(28). According to MOH, 4753 patients were treated for rabies 
exposure in 2013, but no human rabies cases were reported (or 
have been for the last 3 years). MOA reported a total of seven 
cases and seven deaths to OIE in 2013 (29). MOA provides free 
vaccines to vaccinate animals for prevention and control of rabies; 
however, there is a limited vaccine supply and an inability to cover 
the entire susceptible population. Currently, vaccine campaigns 
focus on the companion animal population, covering stray 
dogs only as supplies allow. There is no policy to vaccinate any 
potential wildlife reservoir. Key to the control of rabies in Jordan 
is the containment and vaccination of the stray dog population 
nationwide.
Detection, Notification, and Response
Any human bitten by stray or wild dogs is considered a prob-
able rabies case and the responsible health official uses the case 
definition for determination. All suspect patients are treated 
post-exposure with the rabies vaccination and MOH covers all 
costs for post-exposure prophylaxis and supportive care. Patient 
samples are collected and sent to the Department of Sera and 
Vaccines for confirmation, however, testing of samples is not 
routine, which can lead to unnecessary costs of patient care 
from post-exposure prophylaxis for unconfirmed rabies cases. 
Rabies is an immediately notifiable disease, MOH notifies MOA 
of suspect cases; however, animal bites are reported to MOA 
on a weekly basis and to OIE annually. The Surveillance Unit 
within MOH conducts investigations into suspect cases and 
submit final reports to DCD. Occasionally, the RRT includes 
FigUre 4 | surveillance and laboratory mapping of rabies. Surveillance and laboratory networks for rabies, including nodes of communication and response, 
were mapped across human health and veterinary sectors. Systems were analyzed beginning from report of a suspect case to diagnostic confirmation, including 
evaluation: case reporting; reporting and sample submission; laboratory testing; case management; and outbreak investigation. Efforts in surveillance and response 
lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in green. Positive cases are noted in orange while unknown/
unconfirmed cases are represented in purple. Abbreviations: MOH, Ministry of Health; CPHL, Central Public Health Laboratory; DCD, Directorate of Communicable 
Diseases; MOA, Ministry of Agriculture; CVL, Central Veterinary Laboratory.
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veterinarians and subject matter experts from MOA. In the 
event of suspect rabies case(s) in domesticated or wild animals, 
the local veterinary services is notified and if based on case 
definition the animal is labeled suspect, MOA is immediately 
notified for investigation. If the suspect case is in feral or other-
wise non-domesticated animal(s), they are immediately culled 
without quarantine. If the animal(s) are domesticated, they are 
quarantined for 10 days under the observation of MOA; if the 
animal develops symptoms or succumbs to infection, samples 
are sent to MOH-Department of Sera and Vaccines for diagnos-
tic confirmation. There is currently no public veterinary labora-
tory in Jordan that has capacity to diagnose rabies in animals. 
MOA will conduct an investigation of neighboring areas for 
additional cases and quarantine when necessary. Figure 4 shows 
a flow chart schematic of surveillance and laboratory channels. 
Key to the control of rabies in Jordan is the containment and 
vaccination of the stray dog population nationwide and timely 
confirmation of suspect human cases in order to prevent unnec-
essary extensive health care costs for post-exposure treatments 
on negative patients.
case study #3: Brucellosis
Brucellosis is an important zoonotic disease of livestock, notifi-
able to OIE (30). Globally, human brucellosis is a re-emerging 
zoonotic disease with an estimated 2% case fatality rate, even 
though successful eradication and control programs for 
domestic animals effectively and significantly decrease disease 
incidence in humans, and have been established in many 
at-risk countries. Symptoms of brucellosis in humans include 
fever with multiple non-specific clinical signs and symptoms. 
Delayed diagnosis, chronic disease, failure of primary antibiotic 
treatment, and relapses are common. Brucellosis is transmitted 
through exposure to infected animal products (most commonly 
raw dairy products) or, less frequently, through direct contact 
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with infected camels, cattle, sheep, or goats. More than 500,000 
human cases are reported worldwide each year, (31) but the 
number of undetected cases is believed to be considerably higher. 
Brucella spp. are also categorized as potential biological agents 
for deliberate use in many US and international frameworks due 
to their high contagiousness and their impact on human and 
animal health.
Existing Networks
In 1985, an official system for reporting human cases of brucel-
losis was established by MOH, under the supervision of the 
Communicable Diseases Control Program Division. Spurred 
by a large brucellosis outbreak in Jordan roughly 10 years ago, 
the MOH’s Division of Zoonotic Diseases and veterinary public 
health actors at the MOA developed a cooperative relation-
ship in reporting and response to brucellosis. However, there 
is no national plan. According to OIE reporting, brucellosis 
continues to be in the top three zoonotic diseases reported in 
Jordan (29). In collaboration with CDC, the MOH and others 
conducted a burden of illness study in 2003, including popula-
tion, animal vaccinations, and laboratory surveys and valida-
tion study. However, outbreaks are still prevalent in Ma’an and 
Mafraq governorates on a seasonal basis and for various reasons, 
including the lack of clear clinical symptoms and misdiagnosis, 
human brucellosis is significantly under-reported and under-
diagnosed, particularly by the private health sector (32, 33). In 
Jordan, ruminants, particularly sheep and goats, are vaccinated 
at all ages, at any time during the year, and annual revaccina-
tion is recommended. On average, about 18–25% of the sheep 
and goats in Jordan were vaccinated through 2000, although 
unofficial estimations on vaccine coverage is increasing and can 
be estimated at times to be as high as 50% recently published 
data indicates that only 1.5% of the small ruminant population 
is vaccinated leading to regional endemicity, particularly in 
the north (34, 35). Starting in 2015 a new project will begin, a 
partnership between EMPHNET and CDC with Jordan MOH 
as lead implementer, to estimate disease burden in the human 
population (36).
Detection, Notification, and Response
When a patient presents with symptoms consistent with brucel-
losis and has ingested raw milk or other potentially infected 
dairy products, the health official will use the case definition 
to determine whether to classify the case as suspect brucellosis. 
Suspect human cases are reported to MOH and the Occupational 
Health and the Food and Drug Agency of Jordan. Patients 
may be admitted to a fever hospital to confirm diagnosis and 
initiate treatment. Clinical samples are sent to the governorate 
level laboratory for initial diagnostic testing, and to CPHL for 
confirmatory testing as indicated. The lab results are not shared 
with MOA. When possible, health education is provided to 
at-risk occupational groups (farmers, meat packers, dairies) 
working with animals or animal products; however, there is no 
clear guidance for surveillance and outbreak response for MOH. 
In the event of a suspect case or farm(s), the local veterinary 
services will quarantine the suspect farm(s) and collect samples 
for diagnostic testing at the CVL, at times and when possible 
governorate level labs will perform diagnostics. A team is sent to 
each suspect farm to conduct an investigation, which includes 
an imposed quarantine, provision of herd vaccination history, 
sample collection, and testing. A farm must test negative three 
consecutive times before being cleared. Any animals testing 
positive must be culled. It should be noted that this is the rec-
ommended procedure; however, we do not have country-wide 
data as to whether this is implemented. MOA reports all posi-
tive cases to OIE. Individual animal cases of brucellosis are not 
reported to MOH due to the endemicity of brucellosis in Jordan; 
however, outbreaks are reported directly to DCD. Please see 
Figure 5 for a flow chart schematic of surveillance and laboratory 
channels. As noted above, effective livestock vaccine campaigns 
can significantly reduce the burden of human brucellosis. There 
are clear seasonal patterns associated with human cases and 
outreach and education on zoonotic transmission will be key in 
containing human outbreaks.
Discussion
Mapping of zoonoses and the burden of such diseases can 
help identify vulnerabilities not only where zoonoses pose sig-
nificant health threats but also where efforts can be focused to 
improve prevention, communication, and coordination across 
veterinary and human health. These study findings describe 
existing systems that can be strengthened or applied by 
stakeholders to address current needs within Jordan, and offer 
case studies that can be applied in other contexts. Although 
the findings may appear predictable to those already deeply 
familiar with Jordan’s surveillance and response systems, the 
formal linkages within and across sectors may not be imme-
diately obvious to the increasingly diverse stakeholder and 
partner networks engaged in long-term capacity building for 
global health security.
We found many similarities in surveillance and response 
capacities across local, governorate, and national public and 
veterinary health networks regardless of the pathogen mapped, 
indicating that improvement in response to one specific patho-
gen would most likely improve the ability to respond to other 
zoonoses (Figure  6). The results of our mapping highlighted 
three main areas for improvement toward building national One 
Health capacities: (1) a national zoonotic reporting and com-
munication framework, (2) a national zoonotic preparedness and 
response plan, and (3) increased laboratory diagnostic capacity 
across governorate level laboratories.
national Zoonotic reporting and 
communication Framework
There are strong informal mechanisms for communication and 
coordination within and across local public health and veterinary 
services with consistent reporting up to governorate and national 
levels. However, the local facilities are not always involved in 
outreach and communication strategies for local response. There 
is no standardized structure for communication and information 
FigUre 5 | surveillance and laboratory mapping of brucellosis. Surveillance and laboratory networks for brucellosis, including nodes of communication and 
response, were mapped across human health and veterinary sectors. Systems were analyzed beginning from report of a suspect case to diagnostic confirmation, 
including evaluation: case reporting; reporting and sample submission; laboratory testing; case management; and outbreak investigation. Efforts in surveillance and 
response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in green. Positive cases are noted in orange while 
unknown/unconfirmed cases are represented in purple. Abbreviations: MOH, Ministry of Health; CPHL, Central Public Health Laboratory; DCD, Directorate of 
Communicable Diseases; MOA, Ministry of Agriculture; CVL, Central Veterinary Laboratory.
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sharing across and within surveillance sectors and laboratories. 
There is no formal mechanism or protocol for reporting labora-
tory confirmation beyond CPHL and CVL obligations to report 
back to their relevant ministry departments. There is little, if 
any, cross-talk between CPHL and CVL in both surveillance 
reports and laboratory confirmation. This node of cross-sector 
communication is of particular importance when considering 
sentinel and early warning systems for zoonotic disease outbreaks 
in the veterinary sector and in investigations and response during 
simultaneous outbreaks of zoonoses in humans and animals. We 
recommend establishing a framework for reporting and commu-
nication to and from ministry department focal points to their 
local and governorate counterparts as well as across sectors at 
each level of reporting.
national Zoonotic Preparedness and 
response Plans
Rapid response teams, both locally and nationally deployed, are 
effective in outbreak investigation within their respective sectors; 
however, organization and deployment of multi-disciplinary 
RRTs are extremely pathogen dependent. This inconsistency can 
lead to duplication of efforts during critical phases of outbreak 
response and containment. Although there are disease-specific 
plans, such as the Animal Health National Preparedness Plan 
and National Contingency Plan for Avian Influenza, no national 
framework for preparedness and response to priority zoonotic 
diseases exists. We recommend that RRTs should be multi-
disciplinary at the national level, using the FETP as resource 
to link governorate level epidemiologists available for rapid 
response.
laboratory capacity
Local and governorate level public health and veterinary labora-
tory capacity is inconsistent. Some labs lack the ability to perform 
routine diagnostics, due either to constraints in infrastructure, 
equipment, human resources, and/or funding. This inconsistency 
leads to delays in time to pathogen confirmation and response 
as well as increased diagnostic burdens on the national level 
laboratories, and at times, outsourcing to private laboratories 
for diagnostic confirmation. We propose that Jordan develop a 
national laboratory network, modeled after their experience as a 
member of the Network for the Control of Public Health Threats 
FigUre 6 | Mapping public health and veterinary surveillance and laboratory networks. An overall analysis of existing surveillance and laboratory networks 
for zoonotic diseases, including nodes of communication and response, were mapped across human health and veterinary sectors to indicate areas of strength and 
those requiring strengthening. Efforts in surveillance and response lead by Ministry of Health are represented in blue while those lead by Ministry of Agriculture are in 
green. Strengths within and across sectors are represented by solid blue and green lines. Major gaps are represented in red while minor gaps are represented in 
orange. Abbreviations: MOH, Ministry of Health; CPHL, Central Public Health Laboratory; DCD, Directorate of Communicable Diseases; MOA, Ministry of 
Agriculture; WHO, World Health Organization; OIE, World Organisation for Animal Health; RRTs, Rapid Response Teams.
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in the Mediterranean Regional and South East Europe (EpiSouth) 
Laboratory Network, to provide a formalized, standard protocol 
for private and public laboratory partnership for diagnostic test-
ing or priority pathogens in the event of public and veterinary 
health events and those for routine testing for sentinel surveil-
lance efforts.
Although this project focused on three priority zoonotic dis-
eases in Jordan the challenges identified from both public health 
and veterinary surveillance and laboratory sectors are challenges 
faced by many middle income countries. Our analysis indicates 
that the HPAI networks in Jordan are well developed, coordinated, 
and effective in event identification, diagnosis, and response, 
which suggests that these existing resources can and should be 
leveraged to develop a comprehensive laboratory and surveil-
lance One Health network.
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